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1 Introduction: Gender Issues under Illiberal Democracy
First, I want to give thanks for the chance to give comments at this very 
stimulating symposium. From Professor Pető’s talk, we can understand now 
that, in Hungary today, gender research and issues of academic freedom and 
democracy are under attack from both overt violence and from power that 
attempts to operate invisibly. I have many years of engagement with gender 
studies and graduate-level studies at Ochanomizu University in Japan, so I 
also feel personally indignant at the Hungarian government’s sudden 
elimination of the graduate program in gender studies. We must understand 
the significance of this and share knowledge about ways to counter it across 
borders and collectively.
This emergency symposium was held to counter the obvious attack on 
“academic freedom and democracy” by the government of Victor Orbán in 
Hungary, which banned gender research, and I understand that the aim is to 
counter such overt attacks and share knowledge about strategies. Promoting 
an anti-immigration policy, skepticism of the EU, and adopting a closer 
relationship with China, Orbán’s right-wing government gained momentum 
after winning the second parliamentary election in 2010 and winning the 
National Assembly election on April 8, 2018. According to Prof. Pető’s detailed 
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presentation, gender studies in Hungary today is exposed to a double attack 
under this right-wing government, facing both overt violence through threats 
and harassment delivered anonymously via the Internet and also confronting 
repression by power that seeks invisibility and operates through unilaterally 
implementing systemic changes and effectively hollowing out institutions 
under the guise of simplifying them. The Hungarian government’s removal of 
the graduate program in gender studies at Central European University is 
shocking to anyone familiar with the high standards of gender studies 
education and research in Europe. I personally feel deeply angered at this 
measure because of my own long-standing involvement in gender studies and 
graduate-level education at Ochanomizu University. At the same time, I think 
that we must understand the background to these events and their significance 
in order to share knowledge about ways to counter such measures across 
borders and collectively.
Therefore, I would like to raise the following two points in my comments 
here. My first point relates to what Prof. Pető shared about the current attacks 
on “academic freedom and democracy” and “the problem of gender studies 
under an illiberal democracy,” and my second considers the “backlash” to 
gender as it exists not only in Hungary but also elsewhere.
The term “illiberal democracy” indicates an official government that 
continues to operate under democratic procedures, such as elections, but may 
advocate not liberal democratic values but values associated with 
authoritarianism. After acquiring power, such a government demonstrates a 
high degree of arbitrariness in the executive branch in the policy decision 
process, and also displays a divergence between official statements and actual 
implementation (for example, while declaring freedom of information actually 
obscuring and discarding the most important information). Along with this, 
an illiberal democracy restricts fundamental freedoms associated with liberal 
democracy, such as of speech, belief, expression, and research, as well as of 
individual dignity, often framing such restrictions as “exceptions” and citing 
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reasons of security. And “gender” frequently becomes a target of such national 
governance. This gendered political approach is used to frame issues: for 
example, economic policy problems become defined by gendered expectations: 
e.g., discussions about budget allocations for childcare become defined as a 
problem of working mothers rather than an issue of working parents, thus 
pushing forward a topic that is easier to discuss and criticize in public, in this 
case sidestepping the issue of women working while raising children with 
issues about motherhood more generally. Behind this is the actual political use 
of naturalized ideas about gender that obfuscate the political and economic 
stakes of all these issues, and which actually targets and disciplines “women” 
and insists on individual psychological adjustment to the status quo.
My second point is related to the backlash to “gender,” which has 
developed into a confrontation in Hungary, but is a trend not only in Hungary 
and has been increasing in recent years.
In Japan, even after the 1990s, there were two waves of attacks and 
backlashes against gender in the early 2000s and also now, in the late 2010s. In 
my opinion, the two backlashes actually differ. Basically, the backlash regarding 
“gender” through the first half of the 2000s could not completely assimilate 
the evolving trend toward globalization and was instead formed as a 
neoconservative political movement under neoliberal economic policies but 
on the national level as a kind of “mourning the absence of the father and the 
collapse of the family.” On the other hand, the backlash we witness today is 
new inasmuch as it reflects the global shifts and hegemonic fluctuations that 
emerged in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis.
2 Gender in an Illiberal Democracy
Professor Pető points out that the modern gender issue has become a 
“battlefield for socialization” in the Gramscian sense. This is the consequence 
of a series of neoliberal political and economic effects that causes friction 
between actors that can move freely at a global – or, more precisely, a 
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denationalized – level and actors confined to a national and local level. At the 
level of the nation state, this rift first becomes a battle over the legitimacy of 
accessing the ability of the state to redistribute resources, then comes into 
public consciousness as an issue of “subjectivization in society” and 
controversies arise over the possibility of expanding the realms in which 
political decision-making is possible. And in fact, it is this battle more than its 
consequences that makes the problem itself visible for the first time. What often 
appears at this time, reflecting shifts in gender identity, are also attacks on and 
interventions in the various expressions and discourses that seek to describe 
new sexualities, and on the gender studies and feminist theories that critique 
the existing gender order.
To restate the issue as I understand it: under neoliberalism – free 
marketism, financial liberalization, privatization of public resources, fiscal 
austerity / equilibrium, reduction of social security, personal responsibility  – 
awareness of gender and feminism is actually raised in the context of a 
neoliberal focus on reducing public funding, particularly with fiscal austerity 
measures. We can see this trend very clearly in the EU countries that have 
prioritized policies of fiscal balance and austerity. This actually seems 
reasonable, given that under a series of policies implemented under the name 
of neoliberal policy, especially austerity policy, people are living and doing 
activism, hoping for more fundamentally democratic and diverse ways of being 
and living, even as their own ability and capability to reproduce themselves 
with their own power – and this is, I think, something we can call radical 
democracy in a broad sense – is being chipped away at. The de facto reduction 
in the level of human welfare achieved in the EU countries spills across the 
borders, at which time discourses about familialism and violence emerge. 
Regarding these circumstances, that is to say, the neoliberal project, the British 
feminist economist Susan Himmelweit said that neoliberalism is, in fact, not 
just policy but also contains a set of ideologies that allow people to accept and 
internalize the historically constructed devaluation of human life. In other 
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words, neoliberal policy, contrary to its appearance, has suppressed and 
understated the coexistence and sharing that enabled humans to thrive with 
such freedom and at such a level. Limitation of freedoms of study, expression, 
and speech at universities and public institutions also has the effect of 
threatening our shared knowledge and the decision-making rights of all parties 
concerned.
3 The Experience of the Ochanomizu University Institute for Gender 
Studies (IGS): The Politics of Exclusion / Inclusion / Over-inclusion
Here, in connection with the points made above, and following Prof. Pető’s 
example, I’d like to share my experiences as the head of the Institute for Gender 
Studies (IGS) at Ochanomizu Women’s University to discuss the state of gender 
studies and education at Japanese women’s universities, and its links to 
activism and international collaborative research, mostly from 2000 onward. 
I’ve divided this history into four periods:
1. Pre-history: 1996-2000
‒  Established the first research facility for gender studies and named it the 
Institute for Gender Research.
2. 2000-2008
‒  In 2003, Ochanomizu University adopted its 21st Century COE (Centers 
of Excellence) Program [a program established by Japan’s Ministry of 
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) to fund 
globally competitive university education and research], “Gender 
Research Frontier (F-GENS).” Under F-GENS, advanced and 
interdisciplinary research on gender studies in Japan began in earnest, 
international collaborative research also began. Over 100 young 
researchers were involved in this project, and today it has grown into a 
major player in gender studies in Japan, and its research results have 
been recognized both domestically and internationally.
‒  2005: The Graduate School of Humanities and Sciences established a 
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Doctoral Program in Interdisciplinary Gender Studies
‒  2006: The Graduate School of Humanities and Sciences established a 
Master’s Program in Gender and Social Science
‒  2007: The Graduate School of Humanities and Sciences was reorganized 
as the Graduate School of Humanities and Sciences
‒  This made it systematically possible to obtain a doctorate in gender 
studies in Japan, and, in particular, made it possible to play a role in not 
only the humanities but also in the social sciences. For example, if the 
chief faculty examiner is a specialist in economics, law, political science, 
or sociology, a student can acquire a “doctoral degree in social science” 
and the English name registers as “Ph.D. Social Science / Gender 
Studies,” a title that evidences education as an international gender 
research specialist and that is accepted by international organizations.
3. 2008-2014
‒  However, when the 21st Century COE Program ended, the university 
authorities suddenly ordered that the Institute for Gender Studies (IGS) 
change its name by removing the term “gender” and replacing it with a 
title that used the term “women.” The Institute was notified that if they 
did not change the name accordingly, the IGS budget would be reduced 
to zero. Many outside and around the university still find these actions 
by the university authorities too cruel to believe, but I actually was not 
too surprised at all, having experienced the first backlash in the early 
2000s. At this time, Professor Tachi Kaoru and I were the full-time 
professors at IGS and, after our discussion with the university 
administration, we immediately and firmly refused to change the name. 
At that time, I used a landline telephone, and I can still clearly remember 
the sound as I slammed down my receiver. I had no doubts. IGS 
responded that the social impact of such a name change would have an 
enormous social impact. After that, as expected, the budget from the 
university to IGS was reduced to zero (aside from minimal costs for basic 
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maintenance), and an overt campaign against the Institute began.
‒  However, there was a strong awareness of the necessity of gender 
research and we were surrounded by a supportive community, and even 
if our institute was not appreciated within the university (apart from that 
of individual supporters), our research was respected beyond the 
university and even internationally. IGS was able to survive and continue 
to support cutting-edge research on gender studies thanks to various 
forms of external funding that came through in that time. During this 
time, the graduate school education developed, and established the first 
graduate doctoral course in interdisciplinary gender research in Japan 
to train professional researchers who both specialize in gender studies 
and also have social science qualifications, which today enjoys a good 
reputation domestically and internationally in academia, specialized 
institutions, and in the private sector. I would like to add here that during 
this period, I also heard many stories about our graduate students being 
harassed about specializing in gender studies, told that such research 
being foolish academicism or that they would become unemployable. 
But this is simply not true. I want to be very clear: the employment rates 
for gender researchers, including in academia, are good. It is a matter of 
course. Never succumb to threats. My seminar’s motto was “You can’t 
hammer down a nail that sticks out too far.” I wonder about the 
employment rates of those faculty members who threaten graduate 
students.
‒  Also, at this time, I realized that being confined to scholarly knowledge 
only within one’s university can be fatally dangerous to gender research. 
I understood once again that it is literally essential to have constant 
exchanges with those outside of the university – international 
collaborations and interaction with the feminist movement – and in that 
way explore new ways to produce knowledge.
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4. 2015-now
‒  In 2015, the university authorities told me that the Institute for Gender 
Research, which had operated as an independent organization, would 
be reorganized as the “Research Organization for the Promotion of 
Global Women’s Leadership,” and I was dismissed as the Institute’s head 
without prior notice. From this period onward, the Japanese name for 
IGS also changed. While the official English-language name remains the 
same, in Japanese, the Institute ceased to be a “Center (sentaa)” for gender 
studies but became a “Place (sho, which can also be translated as 
“Institute”).” It also became incorporated as a subordinate organization 
within the Research Organization for the Promotion of Global Women 
Leadership. As compensation for the reorganization, the Institute was 
allocated a fairly generous budget and also more part-time staff. 
‒  More time is needed to make a full evaluation of the current situation. I 
expect that gender researchers will analyze the history of IGS. I think we 
can understand the increase in funding and in staff as a good thing. But 
then, even when the budget is cut, gender studies would continue – it 
did continue. Even under those circumstances, a wonderful generation 
of researchers were brought up. However, I don’t think we can generalize 
from this experience even now. 
‒  It is clear from global gender studies case that the targets of austerity 
policies are related to gendered circumstances. But unlike the EU 
experience, in Japan the response to the 2008 global financial crisis has 
been exhaustive monetary easing and a fiscal spending policy, which 
have given us a kind of bittersweet recognition. Gender research without 
budgetary provisions has clear vision, it doesn’t stray from its definite 
outline and goals. Needless to say, researchers carefully select research 
topics and freely choose their analytical methodologies. The actual 
substance of any guarantee of academic freedom is the total consent of 
the researcher, from their topic and their methodology, to their 
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conclusions and the critiques thereof. Since research is about exposing 
the contents of your head, you cannot proceed without first satisfying 
your own heart. Of course, you can rack up various “achievements.” 
However, if there are enormous budgetary provisions, there is also a risk 
that one’s “research topic” may be assigned, restricted, or directed. It is 
doubtful that such “research topics” passed down from higher up can 
be called “research” for the researchers. The problem, however, is how 
to negotiate and break through the boundaries within such an 
organization, dressed in illiberal democratic attire. There was a time 
when both gender studies and also the IGS bitterly experienced the 
honor of exclusion. However, if gender studies seems like it looks good 
and can be used, and if it can be used as a way to improve an 
international reputation, it will get a budget. But the budget itself does 
not mean free and democratic social inclusion. Rather, what we need to 
be most vigilant against are interventions into the content of research, 
and the manipulation and reorganization of our research topics when 
we receive funding. If it is public funding, freedom of research 
must especially be guaranteed. It is precisely because we are overly 
included, excessively embraced, by authority – authority that is budget-
constrained, illiberal, surrounded by larger forces but puts on a 
democratic face – that we need to be cautious. This concept of excessive 
inclusion – “super inclusion” – originates in a term used to analyze 
modern financialization. It describes the excessive dependence on debt 
that led to the subprime financial crisis. A situation in which no research 
nor organization can exist independently of a budget constrained by a 
fixed timeline and a theme could be called “social super inclusion.” “Free 
research” under illiberal democracy is “free” under the limits of “social 
super inclusion,” but the knowledge that exists in the field can draw the 
boundaries for opposition.
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4 “The Failure of Neoliberalism” and the Polypore State
With the implementation of neoliberal policies, when a policy discourse 
of fiscal austerity or budget cuts emerges, it does not actually mean that 
austerity affects all equally. When the entire 100 percent becomes reduced to 
80 percent, it does not mean a uniform 20 percent reduction across the board. 
The question is what category that 20 percent reduction comes from. In other 
words, “austerity” is policy of unbalanced reductions, fought out as a political 
process, in which some sectors remain untouched while others are cut 
altogether. The reason why social policies that address gender equality often 
become the target of this political fight is because it often becomes an attempt 
to recapture some standard of living once possible for people living in that 
society. This is the “battlefield around social issues” and without this battle 
people probably can’t make gains and truly enjoy them. 
However, in order that people can make gains, there are reductions on the 
basis of free decision making and to make these reductions an ideology of 
arbitrary selection that nevertheless obscures its arbitrariness is necessary. 
Although often dubbed “neoconservatism,” what has become prominent after 
the 2008 global crisis has been the consequences of the fluctuations in the global 
economy, namely the emergence of a new ideology in the wake of the “failure 
of neoliberalism.”
In short, the backlash in the early 2000s was an attack on gender by a 
restored neoconservative ideology that could not cope with globalization. This 
movement, in spite of a national standard of living that had long shown signs 
of breaking, lamented the “weak father’s absence and powerlessness” and 
urged the rehabilitation of a lost gender order. This analysis was almost comical 
in its anachronism, but it was also extremely raw and violent.
On the other hand, after the 2008 global financial crisis, especially from 
2010 onward, the failure of neoliberalism has actually led to a more general 
reduction in the value of human life, so we see more selective attitudes 
regarding humans: the politics of exclusion and discrimination have been 
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brought to the fore. People become discriminatory because they fear being 
discriminated against. One fears becoming the first target of the reduced value 
of human life. That fear is implicitly affirming, because it is sometimes 
endorsed by the arbitrary nature of authority and allows for a modification of 
the meanings of existing systems and their outcomes. In order to carry out the 
arbitrary selections of authority, segregations into excluded and also “super 
included” through budgetary measures and other political processes are 
introduced. To obscure the arbitrariness of this, the aggressive discourse of 
such segregations is more violent than ever. 
I’ll add that, today, after confirming that the two waves of gender backlash 
since the 2000s are different in character, I’ll have to rethink them both. In 
response to the first backlash, in the early 2000s, as a way to end the 
neoconservative attacks, we defined gender as “socially constructed sexual 
differences.” We used such a binary discourse as a cobbled-together response 
to the backlash, and to that end, it could be seen, at least on a rhetorical level, 
as an approval to think of men and women in essentialist terms. We can try to 
excuse such essentialism as a strategy. However, as Shimizu Akiko has argued, 
in the early 2000s feminists could have seized the opportunity to re-examine 
the binary concept of gender differences and they should have offered a 
heartfelt welcome to those children who don’t fit in the binary gendered 
framework, those of diverse sexualities and of gender fluidity. The insufficient 
response to the earlier backlash is at the root of today’s backlash. It has been 
transformed into the violence of the essentialist discourse, revived precisely 
because we postponed working through it. 
For that reason, the question is why we see the residue of such essentialism 
in the reappearance of a more aggressive and discriminatory ideology, and its 
newly adopted guise, after the global financial crisis. The reorganization of the 
Institute of Gender Studies in 2015 was designed to adapt to the Abe 
administration’s slogan of “creating a society in which all women shine” and 
the Act to Promote Women’s Empowerment. But as budgetary measures 
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accompany the implementation of policies that extol “shining women,” gender 
research is seeing reductions, and interventions make it more difficult to 
pursue certain research topics.
Prof. Pető introduced us to a unique and interesting definition for nations 
introducing this new ideology: she calls it the “polypore state.” In my opinion, 
this polypore state takes over one aspect of the currently existing nation state 
and then nests in it, multiplies itself in it, and ultimately corrodes it, achieving 
its objectives by replacing existing systems and using them. Issues related to 
gender are selected as targets to attack, and ideologies against gender equality 
and of the family are used. It appears to be a return to the past, but is actually 
a new phenomenon. In the polypore state, sexualism is strong, and in the 
aspect of the connections made between public institutions funded by taxes 
and privatized organizations, it also seems to be a widespread phenomenon. 
The ideology now concealing the arbitrariness of this form of authority is 
strengthening. 
This leads to a society in which the arbitrariness of power supersedes the 
law of national governance. This is by no means some ancient artifact. Rather, 
this change in the state of national governance is a consequence of the 
transnational economic activities of global capitalism. A situation has emerged 
from modern law-based states in which global political and economic power 
has been acquired by arbitrary few. This power is now de-nationalized. And 
the ordinary people who live on the national and local level have to accept this 
at the cost of a reduction in the value of human life. This is painful. We must 
keep in mind that the transformation of how the national state is ruled is an 
ongoing political issue. 
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